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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/respondent,

:
Case No. 860431

v.
Priority No. 2
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,

:

Defendant/appellant.

:

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of the offense of
Aggravated Robbery, a Felony in the First Degree, in violation
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon,
Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Harry

F.

Suniville, was

State of Utah with the crime of Aggravated
Degree Felony,

in violation of Title

that on or about

1986, appellant

unlawfully

property from
working as

the

and

possession

a teller

for the

of

the

The

intentionally

Mountain

as charged

took

Anderson,

America

in the Information.

the

Section

substance of
February,
personal
who

Credit

which is located at 7050 South Union Park Avenue.
was convicted

6,

28th day of

Suzette

by

Robbery, a First

76, Chapter

302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
this charge was

charged

was

Union,

Appellant

Appellant sub-

sequently filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which motion

was denied.
for am

Appellant was sentencted to the Utah State Prison

indeterminate

period

of

five years to life, with the

commitment issuing forthwith.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order remanding the case for new
trial as a Second Degree Felony, or in the alternative, dismissal
of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did

the

trial

court

commit

error

in

denying

appellant's motion to direct a verdict of not guilty of aggravated
robbery, or, in the alternative, to reduce to simple robbery at
the end of the case presented by the State?
2.

Did the trial court properly instruct the jury as to

the definition of "facsimile of a firearm"?
3.

Did the trial court error in failing to instruct

the jury regarding eyewitness identification and the particular
problems involved with eyewitness identification?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 28th, 1986, Suzette Anderson, while
working as a teller with Mountain America Credit Union, located
in Salt Lake County, was approached
mask.

by a male wearing a ski

The suspect's right hand was in the pocket of the over-

coat he was wearing.

(R. 140)

According to her testimony, the

suspect kept his hand in the pocket and put it over the counter
"like he had a gun".

(R. 140)

The suspect then said that he

was intending to rob her and asked for "big bills"*

(R. 141)

During the course of the robbery, the suspect never took his
right hand from his pocket, nor did he ever display a weapon or
a facsimile of a weapon.

(R. 152-153) Ms. Anderson was unable

to identify the suspect.

(R. 156)

Upon exiting the credit union, the suspect encountered
a number of individuals who were able to describe him in more
detail, since he removed the ski mask that had protected his
identity as soon as he walked out the credit union.

At that

time, Dan Parker was sitting outside the credit union eating
his lunch.

He saw the suspect exit the credit union doors with

a ski mask on and watched him take it off.

(R. 167)

He further

described the person as having one hand in his pocket.
Parker then pursued

the suspect and chased

Mr.

him through the

parking lot. The suspect never displayed a gun nor a facsimile
thereof.

Mr. Parker subsequently was shown photo arrays which

included photos of appellant and identified him as the person
he saw leaving the Credit Union.

Parker made that same iden-

tification in court during the course of the trial.

(R. 169)

Jeffery Randall Hill also testified that he saw a
person matching the general description of the person who had
just robbed

the

credit

union, leaving

stocking wadded up in one hand.

the vicinity

with a

(R. 204) Mr. Hill had occasion

to observe the suspect fleeing the scene, was able to see both
of his hands, and observed the left hand to contain a stocking
and the right hand to be clenched.

(R. 216) Subsequently,

Mr. Hill was shown photo arrays by the police detectives and
identified appellant, in court, as the person he saw fleeing
the credit union.
Harry Barker, a construction worker, was also in the
vicinity of the Credit Union and had occasion to see the suspect
leaving the Credit Union immediately after the robbery.

In

court, he identified appellant as the person he saw leaving the
credit union.

Mr. Barker testified that he saw something in

the suspect's right hand, but was unable to say that it was a
gun.

(R.

231-232)

Mr. Barker

also purported

to

identify

appellant as the person he saw at the location after having
reviewed photos shown to him by police officers.
Nick Dubois testified

for the prosecution.

He was

also working in the area at the time the robbery occurred and
observed the

suspect

leaving

the

scene

in a

brown

Camaro.

Debois subsequently made an identification of a Camaro parked
at the residence where appellant lived.

Debois neither identi-

fied appellant nor placed a weapon or facsimile of a weapon in
the hands of the suspect who left the credit union.

Detective

Glover, who investigated the case, testified that he searched
both appellant's home and his car and

found

no

items that

appeared to be related to the credit union robbery, (R. 269)
and specifically said that no gun was ever found.

(R. 268)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant contends that there

is no evidence that

the robber in the instant case was armed either with a firearm

or a facsimile of a firearm and that, at best, the offense
committed was Robbery, a second degree

felony, pursuant to

Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 301, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, which carries a penalty of not less than one nor more
than fifteen years.
Appellant also contends that the jury was incorrectly
instructed as to the meaning of the word facsimile as it applied
to the aggravated robbery statute.
Finally appellant submits that the trial court's refusal to give a so-called "Telfaire instruction" constituted
reversible error because it unduly prejudiced appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT A WEAPON OR A
FACSIMILE OF A WEAPON WAS USED IN THE
ROBBERY.
Of the several witnesses who testified with relation to
the robbery of the credit union, none were able to place a gun
in the hand of the suspect.

Suzette Anderson testified that

during the course of the robbery, the suspect kept his right
hand in his coat pocket and held that hand up in a threatening manner.

The witnesses who saw the suspect flee described

him as having both hands out of his pocket, holding the stocking
that had covered his face in his left hand.
described him

as having

anything

Only one witness

in his other hand.

That

witness, Harry Barker, was unable to say that the item, whatever
it was, was a firearm or a facsimile thereof.

(R. 231-232)

When asked about the gun Suzette Anderson stated:
0.

He never told you he had a gun did he?

A.

No.

0.

Never showed you his gun?

A. No.
(R. 152)
Mr. Parker, who had adequate opportunity to watch the
entirety of

the flight

facsimile thereof.

of the robber

never saw a weapon or

(R. 177)

This court has previously

considered

the

"facsimile

of a firearm" language of §76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in

State v. Turner, Utah, 572 P.2d

387

(1977).

In

that case, the defendant was charged with the crime of aggravated
robbery and the witness, who was the victim in the case, said
that he observed "one to two inches of a gun barrel" protruding
from underneath

the

defendant's

(Citation supra, at p. 388)

shirt

during

the

The trial court in that case gave

two instructions related to the issue of facsimile.

Instruction

Number 11 stated:
You are instructed that a facsimile is
defined as: an exact and precise copy of
anything. An exact reproduction, for
example, the signature reproduced by a
rubber stamp.
Also, Instruction Number 12 said:
You are further instructed that a facsimile
of a firearm is an instrument that by its
appearance resembles a firearm.
This court, on appeal, held:

robbery.

We find the court's Instruction Number 12
to be a 'sensible interpretation' of the
statutory language.,. . We do not perceive
sufficient tension between the definitions
of 'facsimile' in Instruction Numbers 11 and
12 to constitute effective vagueness."
The conviction against Turner was affirmed.
The arguments made in the form of a motion to dismiss
at the end of the state's case are instructive in considering
the issue raised

on appeal in the instant case.

After the

prosecution had rested, counsel for appellant raised a motion
to dismiss or in the alternative a motion to reduce to robbery,
a second degree felony. Counsel argued that there was no evidence
a weapon or a facsimile thereof had been used in the robbery.
(R. 286)

The prosecutor, while admitting that there was no

evidence a facsimile had been used, argued instead that the
test should be a subjective one, stating:
Our Court days the sensible interpretation
is that any instrument, by its appearance
resembles a firearm, that is a facsimile.
That is what we have here. Perception by
the teller that it is a firearm. I submit
there is sufficient evidence to show that
the defendant, the perpetrator, intended
the victim perceive that as a firearm. (R.
249)
This argument was apparently adopted by the court in
making the rulings:
It is the court's belief in the interpretation
of the statute involved and in the light of
State v. Turner, when one uses any object
with the intent to make the victim believe
there is a gun and the victim reasonably
could believe there is a gun that whatever
object is being used is, in fact, a facsimile
of a firearm whether it is a piece of pipe

in the pocket or a plastic gun or even a
finger, if it is perceived by the victim as
being a gun and is intended by the perpetrator to be a gun or to at least make the
victim think it is a gun, I believe we have
the elements necessary to meet the requirements of aggravated armed robbery. Based
upon that, I am going to deny your motion
to dismiss or reduce. (R. 296)
This adoption of a "subjective standard" is not mandated by
Turner, supra.
The issue was broached by both counsel in closing
arguments.

Counsel for the state argued that while no gun was

ever found, the appropriate test was whether the victim thought
it was a gun, to which counsel for appellant interposed an
objection.

(R. 326)

Counsel

for the state was allowed to

continue arguing that the subjective perception by the victim
that a weapon was used was sufficient to prove that a facsimile
of a weapon has been used.

(R. 326)

Following the prosecutor's

rebuttal argument, counsel for appellant moved for a mistrial
based on the prosecutor's argument relating to the subjective
issue of whether it was a facsimile or not, which motion was
denied.

(R. 362)
The record currently before the court in the instant

case differs in two important particulars from Turner.

First,

in Turner the witness/victim identified "one or two inches of
gun barrel".

Turner presents a factual question to the jurors,

which is "was the witness correct in his perception that he saw
a gun barrel?". This case presents no such issue since no gun
or portion of a gun was ever seen by anyone.

In fact, there is

every reason to believe that no gun was used, since when the
suspect fled

the Credit Union and was pursued, he did not

produce a weapon with which to defend himself from his pursuers.
The second difference is that the Turner court approved two
instructions, which taken in combination, would not mislead the
jury there or in the instant case. However, to define a facsimile
as "any item or thing that in its appearance resembles a firearm"
without further clarification, is to lead to the kind a vague
and constitutionally imprecise instruction that possibly caused
the jury to convict on an aggravated robbery where there was no
evidence of a gun or any facsimile thereof.
The court in Turner quoted Websters New Unabridged
Dictionary, 2nd Edition, which defines "facsimile" as "1. act
of making copy, imitation".

That definition has not changed in

the current edition of that dictionary.
Revised 4th Edition, defines

Black's Law Dictionary,

"facsimile" as "an exact copy,

preserving all the marks of the original", which language was
requested by the defendant in the defendant's requested jury
instruction.

The

New

American

Heritage

Dictionary

of

the

English Language defines "facsimile" as "1. an exact copy or
reproduction as of a document", or "2.

exactly reproduced;

duplicate".
The issue that presents itself here is whether there
was sufficient evidence of a "facsimile of a weapon" to allow
the matter to be decided by the jury.

It is appellant's conten-

tion that since there was no evidence of a weapon, that no
witness ever saw a weapon of facsimile thereof, and none was

recovered after the robbery, the court erred in submitting the
matter to

the

jury

as

a

first

degree

felony,

Aggravated

Robbery,
While the suspect made threats consistent with his
having a weapon, and kept one hand in his pocket as if there might
be something in that pocket, no evidence was presented at trial to
the existence of an actual weapon or a facsimile thereof either
at the scene of the crime or subsequently in appellant's house,
vehicle, or about his person.

Therefore, the trial court erred

in denying appellant's motion at the end of the State's case
to either dismiss the aggravated robbery or reduce it to simple
robbery and the case against appellant should be remanded for
trial as a robbery under §76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE PROPER DEFINITION OF
"FACSIMILE".
As stated in the argument above in Turner, supra the
court approved

two

instructions,

Instruction

No.

states:
You are instructed that a facsimile is
defined as: an exact and precise copy of
anything. An exact reproduction, for
example, the signature reproduced by a
rubber stamp.
Also, Instruction Number 12 said:
You are further instructed that a facsimile
of a firearm is an instrument that by its
appearance resembles a firearm.

11

which

Counsel for appellant in the instant case requested an instruction which encompassed the language included in
Instruction Number 11 of Turner, supra (defendant's requested
Instruction Number 6, paragraph 2, R. 356).

Counsel for the

State requested an instruction which was similar to the Intruction Number 12 in Turner, supra, which defined "facsimileM as
follows:
A facsimile of a firearm is any item or
thing that by its apearance resembles a
firearm.
The court

gave

the

prosecutions

instruction

as

Instruction

Number 18 (R. 72), but declined to give defense counsels requested
Instruction Number

6 (R. 56).

Hence, the only

instruction

given to the jury as a purported aid in determining whether a
facsimile of a weapon was used

is the definition of "fac-

simile" .
While appellant in Turner, supra, may not have been
unduly prejudiced by the giving of the two instructions which, in
combination, purported to define

facsimile of a weapon, the

deletion of one-half of the information contained in those two
instructions as the trial court did in the instant case was
excessively vague.

The giving of the single instruction failed

to provide adequate information to the jury whereas the combination of the two instructions was able to pass constitutional
muster in Turner.
The sole instruction given to the jury in the instant
case with regard to the definition of facsimile is:

A facsimile of a firearm is any item or
thing that by its appearance resembles a
firearm.
This simple instruction is unconstitutionally vague and would
not have been helpful to a jury in considering the issue.

In

addition, taken in the absence of the other instructions in
Turner which defined the word facsimile, the jury was left to
speculate as to what a "facsimile" was or would be under the
circumstances presented by the State in the instant case.
Wherefore appellant asks that the court remand the
case for trial with the appropriate instructions as to "facsimile
of a weapon".
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION.
While several witnesses from the Credit Union described
the clothing the suspect was wearing, no one from inside the
bank purported to make an identification of appellant or any
other person.

However, several people from the vicinity of the

parking lot outside

the Credit Union described

the fleeing

suspect and purported to identify appellant during the course
of the trial.
Suzette Anderson

could

not make an identification,

but did describe the suspect's gait as being "very similar".
(R. 143) She also indicated that the suspect was wearing a
gold/yellow coat that was very long.

(R. 150)

Ms. Anderson

described the suspect as being 180 to 200 pounds and 6' tall.
The State next called Dan Parker to the witness stand.
Mr. Parker identified appellant as the person he saw leaving
the credit union.
tall and

(R. 169)

He described

140 pounds with brown hair.

him as being 6'

(R. 181)

Mr. Parker

described the person as wearing a "mountaineer" type of coat of
gold color (R. 166f 167) , which extended to the crotch level. (R.
176)

The State next called Jeffery Randall Hill to the witness

stand.

Mr. Hill

was

outside

following the robbery.

the

Credit

Union

immediately

Mr. Hill described the person who he

saw as having brown hair, 5'10" or 5'11" and "wearing a heavy
coat all puffed up".

(R. 203)

color of that jacket.

Mr. Hill was not sure of the

Mr. Hill purported to make an in court

identification of appellant as being the person he saw on that
occasion, but described the color of the coat as being a greenishbrown or khaki color.

(R. 216)

Harry Barker, who was also outside the Credit Union,
identified appellant in the courtroom as the robber.

Barker

described the parka as being gathered at the waist and being
tan in color.

(R. 230)

6' tall, 160-170 pounds.

Barker described the suspect as being
(R. 232)

The State then called Nick Dubois who was unable to
identify the suspect, but saw the vehicle in which the suspect
left, which he described as a "chocolate brown Camaro between
the year 1970 to 1975".

(R. 243)

The witness was then told to

visit the neighborhood of 2235 Dallin wherein he subsequently
made an identification of a vehicle which was identified as

being registered to appellant.
Appellant's counsel requested a so-called "Telfaire"
instruction, the substance of which was to advise the jury as
to the potential

difficulties

of

eye-witness

Said instruction

was

by

the

instruction included

refused

court

and

the

courtf s

no particular reference to possible dif-

ficulties with eye-witness identification.
of instruction

identification.

requested

by defense

(R. 55)

The type

counsel has had

occasions to be reviewed by the Utah

Supreme

Court

numerous
following

the case of United States v. Telfaire, 469 P.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1972).

This court held, in State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah

1985); State v. Reedy,

681

P.2d

1251

(Utah

1984);

State v.

Newton, 681 P.2d

833 (Utah 1984); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d

56 (Utah

and

1982);

State v. Schaffer,

1981) that the giving

638

P.2d

of such an instruction

largely to the discretion

of the trial court.

the passage of time, it became

clear

1185

(Utah

was to be left
However, with

to the court

that the

requested cautionary instructions as to eye-witness identification were not being routinely given by the trial courts.
State v. Long, 721

P.2d

483

(Utah

length the various difficulties

1986) this court

In

cited at

and errors that arise in the

process of eye-witness identification and the scholarly studies
that have been done to point out the difficulties
witness identification.

inherent in

Long, supra, p. 488-491.

held:
We are convinced that, at a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the jury in
evaluating such testimony is warranted. We

The court

therefore today abandon our discretionary
approach to cautionary jury instructions
and direct that in cases tried from this
day forward, trial courts shall give such an
instruction whenever eye-witness identification is a central issue in a case and
such an instruction is requested by the
defense. Given the great weight jurors are
likely to give eye-witness testimony, and
the deep and generally unperceived flaws in
it, to convict the defendant on such evidence
without advising the jury of the factors
that should be consider in evaluating it
could well deny the defendant due process
of law under article I, section 7, of the
Utah Constitution. IQ. at page 492.
It is quite clear that eye-witness identification was
"a central issue" in the instant case and counsel for appellant
requested an instruction which comported in substance with the
type of jury
(R. 55)

instruction

that this court mandated

in Long.

However, appellant's trial occurred on the 10th and

11th day of June, 1986, and the opinion in Long, supra, which,
by its terms, was to be applied "in cases tried from this date
forward", was filed on June 20th, 1986.
filed no

judgment had been entered

When Long, supra, was

against appellant, with

sentencing having been set for July 7th, 1986, and judgment
against was not entered until July 7th, 1986.

(R. 106)

After becoming aware of the ruling in Long, supra,
defense counsel filed a motion in arrest of judgment based on
the ruling of the case (R. 104), which motion was denied by the
court on July 7th, 1986, (R. 106).
sentenced

to prison.

Whereupon appellant was

In other words, had appellant's trial

occurred one week later, he would have been entitled, pursuant
to Long, supra, to an instruction which informed the jury as to

some of the difficulties which occur in eye-witness identification.

To have the substantial rights of defendants turn on

such arbitrary dates is to give the appearance of arbitrariness
on the part of the justice system and ought to be avoided,
particularly since

judgment

against

appellant

had

not been

entered at the time Long was decided.
Even absent

the

ruling

in Long

it is appellant's

contention he should have been entitled to a reversal since the
court's refusal to give the appropriate "Telfaire" instruction
was in violation of the court's discretion granted prior to the
ruling in Long.

Since Long, supra, this court has ruled in

State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d

1378, where the court continued to

examine discretionary action of the trial court in those pre-Long
cases involving the refusal of the court to give a cautionary
instruction.

As the court stated in Jonas;

Trial of the present case preceded Long,
and therefore defendant's claim must be
evaluated under the prior case law to
determine whether the trial court abused
it's discretion in refusing to give the
cautionary instruction. Ld. 1380.
At the outset, it ought to be noted that Jonas, supra,
is different than the instant case in that judgment

in that

case was final at the time that Long, supra, was decided.

In

Jonas, supra, the court reversed appellant's conviction, holding
that "the trial court abused

its discretion in not giving a

cautionary instruction about the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification" at 1381. Counsel for appellant submits
that the same treatment ought to be accorded appellant in this

case.

While Jonas represents a single eye-witness case and the

instant appeal represents a multiple eye-witness identification,
the difficulties inherent in eye-witness identification still
exist here.
The wide disparity of descriptions, in height and
weight as well as the description of the suspects clothing,
demonstrate that there is a substantial likelihood of error in
the eye-witness identification.

Because of all the foregoing,

the judgment and conviction of Aggravated Robbery

should be

reversed and the case remanded to the district court for a new
trial.
CONCLUSION
The total lack of evidence that a weapon or facsimile
of a weapon was used

in the commission of the offense with

which appellant was charged, the failure of the trial court to
give an adequate
weapon" and

the

jury

instruction defining

refusal

of the

"facsimile

court to give

an

of a

adequate

instruction regarding the difficulties with eye-witness identification dictate that appellant's conviction for Aggravated
Robbery should be reversed and the case should be remanded to
the trial court for a new trial for the crime of Robbery, under
§76-3-601, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Dated this

day of January, 1987.

BRADLEY P. RICH
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ADDENDUM
§76-6-301, Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953

as amended.

Robbery.

(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property in the possession of another from his person,
or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means
of force or fear.
(2)

Robbery is a felony of the second degree.

§76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Robbery.

Aggravated

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course
of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife
or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon; or
(b)

Causes serious bodily injury upon another.

(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in
an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.

